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Abstract
We estimate the perceived costs of legal requirements (‘coexistence measures’) for
growing genetically modiﬁed (GM) Bt maize in Germany using a choice experi-
ment. The costs of the evaluated ex-ante and ex-post coexistence measures range
from zero to more than €300 per measure and most are greater than the extra rev-
enue the farmers in our survey expect from growing Bt maize or than estimates in
the literature. The cost estimates for temporal separation, the highest in our evalu-
ation, imply that the exclusion of this measure in Germany is justiﬁed. The costliest
measures of the ones that are currently applied in Germany are joint and strict lia-
bility for all damages. Our results further show that neighbours do not cause a
problem and opportunities for reducing costs through agreements with them exist.
Finally, we ﬁnd that farmers’ attitudes towards GM crops aﬀect the probability of
adoption of Bt maize. Our results imply that strict liability will deter the cultivation
of Bt maize in Germany unless liability issues can be addressed through other
means, for example, through neighbours agreements.
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1. Introduction
The EU Commission has decided that both producers and consumers should be free
to cultivate and consume the product of their choice: be it organic, conventional or
genetically modiﬁed (GM) crops (European Commission, 2010). To ensure that GM
crops can be separated from non-GM crops at the farm level, many EU countries
have implemented coexistence measures (i.e. legal requirements to ensure coexis-
tence)2 (see Beckmann et al., 2014 for an overview). Coexistence measures in the
European Union include ex-ante regulation requirements that farmers must comply
with when cultivating GM crops as well as ex-post liability rules that determine how
legal cases of GM crop cultivation issues are handled. The success of coexistence
measures is aﬀected by diﬀerent farming conditions in EU Member States.
Coexistence measures at the farm level are diﬃcult to price and cost estimates are
largely missing in the literature. Our main contribution is to analyse how farmers who
have experience with coexistence measures value them. For the analysis, we conducted
a survey among farmers in Germany who planted GM Bt maize (denoted as Bt farm-
ers) and their neighbouring farmers (denoted as non-Bt or neighbour farmers).3 We
surveyed farmers using a choice experiment and econometrically estimated the costs
of diﬀerent coexistence measures with a conditional logit model (CLM).
Even though the cultivation of Bt maize in Germany has been prohibited since
2009, knowing the costs of coexistence measures is important for economic and politi-
cal decisions. First, measures have been implemented in Germany, but their costs
from a farmer’s viewpoint have never been assessed econometrically. Second, the cost
estimates can be used for comparisons with other countries. Third, similar coexistence
measures may be considered for crops derived from other controversial cropping tech-
nologies, either to satisfy standards initiated by the private sector or because they fall
under the GM regulation. One example that illustrates this possibility is the case of
so-called New Plant Breeding Technologies (NPBTs). The decision at EU level of
whether to regulate NPBTs as a GM or a conventional technology is still pending.
Furthermore, the USDA has recently published a report (Greene et al., 2016) dis-
cussing the importance of coexistence issues within US agriculture. They ﬁnd that the
major strategy for coexistence at farm level is the use of buﬀer strips. Hence, the issue
is not only of interest for the EU but also for other regions where GM crops are
cultivated.
Previous literature analysing the cost of coexistence measures relies on small case
studies with either direct assessments based on accounting principles (e.g. Messean
et al., 2006; Consm€uller et al., 2010; Skevas et al., 2010; Venus et al., 2011) or on sim-
ulations (e.g. Messean et al., 2006). Using simulations based on expert opinions and a
Geographic Information System simulation Messean et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the coexis-
tence costs for the Poitou-Charentes region in France can vary widely, depending on
the farming system. For instance, if farms share a combine harvester, the costs
amount to €57 per cleaning. They estimate that shifting of the ﬂowering time can add
2Coexistence refers to the conditions under which GM and non-GM agricultural products can
be grown in the same territory, transported and marketed side by side, preserving their identity
in accordance with the relevant labeling rules and purity standards (Schenkelaars and Wesseler,
2016).
3Bt maize is a GM crop that contains a trait, inserted through genetic modiﬁcation, that makes
crops resistant to the European Corn Borer (Ostrinia nubilalis).
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a cost of more than €201/ha. For buﬀer zones, cost estimates range between €17/ha
and €78/ha.
Case studies by Consm€uller et al. (2010) and Venus et al. (2011) show that farmers
perceive many coexistence measures as acceptable. A possible reason for the high
acceptance in those studies was the well above average farm size, which allowed the
farmers to plant Bt maize in areas where conﬂicts with neighbours can be avoided.
However, farmers with many ﬁelds adjoining neighbours or with relatively small ﬁeld
sizes perceived the minimum distance requirement as having a stronger negative
impact. An agreement made with a grain trader to buy Bt maize containing the poten-
tially Bt-contaminated maize of neighbours helped to reduce liability issues. Both case
studies report mostly good relationships with neighbouring farmers. However, Venus
et al. (2011) report conﬂicts with representatives of the municipality and the church
or landlords.
Although coexistence measures are meant to guarantee freedom of choice between
GM and non-GM crop cultivation, several papers have shown that minimum distance
requirements discriminate against small farms (e.g. Devos et al., 2009; Beckmann
et al., 2010; Consm€uller et al., 2010). This result may explain why research ﬁndings
show a positive impact of farm size on the GM adoption probability (e.g. Breustedt
et al., 2008). Beckmann et al. (2011) show that depending on the property right, in
the presence of minimum distance requirements non-Bt farmers may pose a negative
externality on the Bt farmers by increasing Bt farmers’ coexistence costs. Minimum
distance can severely limit the economic beneﬁts of GM growers in areas with non-
GM farmers such that potential GM growers remain or convert back to non-GM cul-
tivation (Demont et al., 2008; Groeneveld et al., 2013). Demont et al. (2009) and
Devos et al. (2013) argue that ﬂexible coexistence regulations (e.g. buﬀer zones)
instead of rigid ones (e.g. minimum distance requirements) may reduce a possible
domino eﬀect that pressures potential Bt farmers to shift to non-GM maize cultiva-
tion. Studies in countries without the minimum distance requirement, however, also
document a size eﬀect (i.e. that larger farms are more likely to adopt GM crops) (e.g.
Hubbell et al., 2000; Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2002) without explicitly identifying
the reasons.
For farmers to adopt Bt maize, coexistence costs have to be outweighed by the extra
revenue of Bt maize compared to conventional maize. This proﬁtability depends on
several agronomic and economic factors such as the European Corn Borer infestation
rate, farm structure, pest control management or maize acreage per farm (e.g. Breust-
edt et al., 2008; Consm€uller et al., 2010). Areal et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the major rea-
sons for farmers to adopt herbicide-resistant maize and oilseed rape in six European
countries are a guaranteed higher income and the reduction in weed control costs.
However, the social environment, farmer’s knowledge about and attitudes towards
GMOs, age and education have also been identiﬁed to aﬀect potential adoption (e.g.
Gyau et al., 2009; Areal et al., 2011; Skevas et al., 2012). Several studies have used
choice experiments to analyse factors inﬂuencing farmers’ choice of adopting
GM-crops (see Breustedt et al., 2008, for an overview). However, these studies do
not explicitly calculate the costs of coexistence measures.
As shown earlier, arguments on the choice and impact of coexistence measures are
often based on theoretical models, simulations or narratives. To judge the importance
of the impact on farmers, econometric cost estimates are missing in the literature. We
provide these estimates derived from choice experiments with former Bt maize farmers
and their neighbours in Germany – one of the few countries besides the Czech
 2016 The Agricultural Economics Society
Coexistence Costs of GMMaize in Germany 409
Republic, Portugal and Slovakia, where farmers have experience in complying with a
complete national coexistence regulation regime. The estimates form a basis for fur-
ther discussion on this issue for researchers and policy-makers and constitute a valida-
tion for previous theoretical work.
2. Material and Methods
2.1. Coexistence measures in Germany
Germany is one of the EU Member States that allowed farmers to grow GM Bt maize
after the EU approved its cultivation. The German government approved Bt maize
cultivation in 2005, but banned it again in early 2009. During the period of 2005 to
2008, 91 farmers from 12 out of 16 German federal states registered Bt maize cultiva-
tion areas. The total area increased each year and reached a total of 3,171 hectares or
0.15% of the total German maize production in the last year before the ban (BVL,
2016). More than 92% of the Bt maize area was located in three federal states: Bran-
denburg (39%), Saxony (30%) and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (24%).
In 2008, coexistence measures for Germany were formulated in the German Genetic
Engineering Act (GenTG), complemented by the Genetic Engineering Plant Act
(GenTPﬂEV) and by the Regulation on the implementation of the EU regulation on
labelling and application of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) (Federal Min-
istry of Germany, 1990, 2004, 2008). The ex-ante and ex-post coexistence measures
for the cultivation of Bt maize include:
1 Compulsory registration. A farmer who plants a GM crop has to inform the Federal
Oﬃce of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) 3 months before the
intended GM plant seeding.
2 Spatial isolation minimum distance. Genetically modiﬁed maize must keep a dis-
tance of 150 m from conventional and 300 m from organic maize ﬁelds. Federal
States have the right to implement additional minimum distance requirements to
nature conservation areas. The Federal States of Brandenburg and Baden-Wuert-
temberg, for example, require a minimum distance of 800 and 3,000 m, respec-
tively, between a Bt maize ﬁeld and a nature conservation area.
3 Obligation to notify the BVL and neighbours about the intention to cultivate GM
plants. Neighbours are owners of a ﬁeld within 300 m from the GM ﬁeld.
4 Private arrangements. The Bt farmer can agree with the neighbour to reduce the
obligatory minimum distance up to 3 months before seeding. The neighbour has to
sign an admonition. If the neighbour does not answer the request within 1 month,
it is considered as consent to the Bt farmer’s request. The Bt farmer has to inform
the BVL about the agreement.
5 Obligation to inquire information from the lower nature conservation authority. The
Bt farmer has to ask for information about nature protected areas 3 months before
seeding if all conditions for the environmental protection are pertinent.
6 Obligation to document. The Bt farmer has to document the seed used and the loca-
tion of the genetically modiﬁed plants. Additionally, the document must contain
the cultivation technique and potential growth of unintended GM maize in the
following year (i.e. volunteers). The farmer has to destroy volunteer GM plants.
7 Avoidance of commingling. The farmer has to prevent GM seeding and GM harvest
material from commingling with conventional material; the farmer must, for
instance, clean all machinery that could potentially lead to an admixture.
 2016 The Agricultural Economics Society
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8 Crop rotation. Farmers must wait for at least 1 year before cultivating conventional
maize in a ﬁeld if GM maize grew on that ﬁeld before.
Prior to these regulations a 20-m pollen barrier was recommended as a best practice
measure at farm level (Weber et al., 2007; Consm€uller et al., 2010).
2.2. Selection of farms and study design
A total of 91 farmers planted Bt maize in the period of 2005–2008 in Germany. We
approached those farmers as they have experience with coexistence measures. We also
included their neighbour farmers because Bt maize producers need to inform neigh-
bouring farmers about their intention to cultivate GM crops. Although the size of our
sample does not allow inference about German farms in general, it does allow com-
parison of the estimated coexistence costs with the expected Bt maize beneﬁts. More-
over, because the farmers in our sample cultivated Bt maize, our results are based on
past experience rather than on expectations.
In June 2012, the Federal Oﬃce of Consumer Protection and Food Safety sent out
a letter to all 91 farmers. The letter asked them to provide their names and addresses
to the project institution (Technische Universit€at M€unchen). Two out of the 91 letters
were returned because the address was wrong or the recipient was unknown. Initially,
35 farmers replied to the letter. Of those who replied, 24 agreed to participate in the
survey. The reasons of those who declined included: ‘. . . cultivation and coexistence
are currently not relevant for agriculture’, ‘. . . fed up with the ban by the politicians’,
‘. . . had trouble in the ﬁrst year. Yield was 20% extra, though’, ‘. . . was criminalised
by neighbours’ and ‘. . . was forbidden by landowner to grow GM’. The 24 farmers
who agreed received a personal phone call, in which four changed their mind about
participating.
InnoPlanta e.V.,4 an organisation at which all Bt farmers are registered, contacted
ﬁve additional Bt farmers who had not replied to the BVL letter. Four of them agreed
to participate in the survey.5 The surveyed Bt farmers identiﬁed seven additional Bt
neighbour farmers who initially had not replied to the BVL letter. Three of the Bt
neighbours agreed to participate, resulting in a sample size of 27 Bt-farmers.
The 27 Bt farmers in the survey provided contact for 53 non-Bt neighbours. All of
the neighbours received a request by phone to participate in the survey. 20 non-Bt
neighbour farmers agreed to participate. The main reasons for refusal were ‘. . . no
time’, ‘. . . no interest in the topic’, ‘. . . do not plant maize’, ‘. . .area is leased out’, ‘. . .
responsible person is retired, sick, or passed away’. In summary, 27 Bt and 20 non-Bt
farmers participated in the survey.
Our sample farms are in six out of the 16 German federal states (Table 1). Most
sample farms are in Brandenburg, which was the state with the largest Bt maize pro-
duction. Farms in Saxony, the second largest Bt maize cultivating state in Germany,
are also well-represented. Farmers were mostly evenly spread within the states except
4InnoPlanta e.V. is an association whose objective is to promote agro-biotechnological and
modern plant breeding activities of farmers, companies, scientiﬁc institutions and others and to
connect them in a network.
5The one who disagreed had problems with his landowners and did not want to be further con-
nected with GMO activities.
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for Bavaria where all farmers were in the northern part that has the highest applica-
tion of insecticides against the European Corn Borer (Zellner et al., 2009).
All respondents are highly involved in the arable production decision of the farm
either as farm owners or managers (39 cases), or as plant department managers (8
cases). They were all employed during the time when Bt maize was planted and hence
were well-informed; they were either involved in the decision in favour of or against
Bt maize or, in case of non-Bt farmers, knew about their Bt neighbours’ decision.
2.3. The survey questionnaire
The questionnaire included general questions on farm and farmers’ characteristics.
Farm characteristics included general farm type (arable, mixed, livestock or other),
speciﬁc farm type (e.g. cereal, dairy or hog), farm-utilised agricultural area (UAA) (in
hectares), and farm land leased. We also included questions on maize production,
such as the cultivated maize; ranking of limits that prevented the farmer from receiv-
ing the maximum maize yield; as well as a 10-point scale ranking of the European
Corn Borer damage and weed damage, if not or only insuﬃciently controlled.
The questionnaire also included socio-demographic characteristics such as the job
position of the respondent within the farm, his or her farming experience, age, gender
and level of education. Questions on the private farm household addressed the num-
ber of employees and farm income. Furthermore, we asked about the 2008 conven-
tional and Bt grain and silage maize production. We gathered information on the
planted area, number of ﬁelds and yield of the crops. In most cases, the exact yield,
especially for silage maize, was not available, so the information was rather farmers’
best estimate. Further information included the percentage of on-farm usage of maize,
and if sold, the selling strategy and price per metric tonne. To examine farmers’ atti-
tudes, we used a Likert scale with 15 items about their perception of GM foods, food
health and environmental issues, and of the role of the government.
Table 1
A summary of farmers’ characteristics
All Bt Non-Bt
n = 47 n = 27 n = 20
Gender
Male 45 27 18
Education
University (of applied sciences) degree 37 22 15
Juristic person
Yes 37 24 13
Federal state
Bavaria 10 3 7
Brandenburg 14 11 3
Mecklenburg-W. Pom. 5 1 4
Saxony-Anhalt 3 2 1
Saxony 14 9 5
Thuringia 1 1 0
Source: Authors’ survey.
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To examine the costs of coexistence, the survey included a discrete choice experi-
ment requiring farmers to make a trade-oﬀ between a set of four coexistence measures
and one monetary attribute – the extra gross margin from planting GM crops. The
coexistence measures were some of those recommended by the European Commission
(European Commission, 2003). We chose measures for which we expected a low cor-
relation with one another. We excluded, for example, buﬀer zones because of a large
correlation with minimum distance. Table 2 presents the ﬁve attributes.
Each attribute varies within three available levels. A full factorial design comprises
35 = 243 possible combinations of attributes. Statistical design methods were then
used to structure the presentation of the attribute levels within the choice sets. A
D-optimal experimental design was constructed with only the main eﬀects (Johnson
et al., 2006). A fraction of the full factorial design was employed to construct an eﬃ-
cient design with 12 choice sets, in which each level occurred once in each attribute
and choice set. During the survey, each farmer was presented with those 12 choice
sets, each containing two options to grow Bt maize and an option to ‘opt out’ by
planting conventional maize with the information that this option could not lead to
an additional gross margin but also does not require coexistence measures. This
design results in a total of 47 9 12 = 564 responses.
Before the choice sets were presented, the respondents had to read a short text
explaining that their decision in the choice set will have an eﬀect on their economic
outcome. Table 3 shows one of the 12 choice sets presented to the farmer.
Table 2
Attributes and levels of the choice experiment
Attributes Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
(1) Liability Not liable Only if non-compliant with
coexistence rules (negligence)
Joint and strict
(2) Minimum distance None 50 m 100 m
(3) Information provision None Neighbour Location register
(4) Temporal isolation None 2 weeks 4 weeks
(5) Extra gross margin €25 €75 €150
Table 3
A sample choice set
Alternative 1
Bt
Alternative 2
Bt
Alternative 3
Conventional
Liability Liable only in case of
non-compliance
Joint and strict
Minimum distance 50 m 50 m
Information provision To public register To neighbours
Temporal isolation Not needed Not needed
Additional gross margin €25/ha €25/ha
Option choice ☐ ☐ ☐
 2016 The Agricultural Economics Society
Coexistence Costs of GMMaize in Germany 413
2.4. Evaluation of coexistence costs
The coexistence value as deﬁned by Beckmann and Wesseler (2007) represents a basic
concept for the calculation of the coexistence cost. The coexistence value is computed
by subtracting ex-ante and expected ex-post costs of coexistence from the additional
gross margin derived from Bt maize compared to conventional maize. In the choice
experiment, the coexistence measures are considered as attributes that a proﬁt-maxi-
mising farmer only accepts if the coexistence value of Bt maize planting is positive fol-
lowing Lancaster’s (1966) attribute concept. Since coexistence measures are negative
characteristics (i.e. reduce utility), the farmer will only accept these measures if Bt
maize yields extra value on top of the reference: conventional maize without coexis-
tence measures.
Two types of predictor variables are distinguished: alternative-invariant and alter-
native-variant predictors. Alternative-invariant variables w0i such as farmers’ educa-
tion or attitudes vary only over the farmer i, but do not vary over the alternative j.
Alternative-variant variables are the attributes x0ij, that is, the coexistence measures as
well as the gross margin that vary over the farmer i and also diﬀer in each choice set
with each of the two GM alternatives j.
The suitability of a conditional logit model for the evaluation of the data can be
tested by checking for the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), that is,
whether the exclusion of one of the alternatives is truly irrelevant. We test for IIA
using the Hausman speciﬁcation test to compare a full CLM with two CLMs, each
excluding one of the two Bt alternatives (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). In both
cases, we ﬁnd that the constrained and unconstrained estimated coeﬃcients on the
remaining categories are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, implying no rejection of the IIA,
thus indicating the suitability of the CLM model.
The three alternatives a farmer can choose are {Bt1, Bt2, conv}, where Bt1 and Bt2
are the ﬁrst two Bt choice options and conv is the third conventional option. Based on
McFadden’s (1974) random utility theory, the utility, Uij, for the ith farmer to choose
the jth maize alternative that maximises his or her utility is:
Uij ¼ x0ijbþ w0icj þ eij: ð1Þ
The coeﬃcient cconv of the conventional alternative, which serves as the reference, is
normalised to zero. There are two sets of coeﬃcients, cj, however. Following Breust-
edt et al. (2008), we restrict the alternative-invariant coeﬃcients not to vary between
the two Bt alternatives, that is, cBt1 = cBt2 = c. For the alternative-variant coeﬃcient,
the conventional alternative serves as the reference, such that the predictor
x0ij ¼ x0ij  x0iconv and the error terms become eij ¼ e0ij  e0iconv. The probability that the
observed outcome, yj = j, that is, that the ith farmer chooses alternative j 2 {Bt1,
Bt2} is:
pij ¼ Probðyi ¼ jÞ ¼
expðx0ijbþ w0icjÞP3
k¼1 expðx0ijbþ w0ickÞ
: ð2Þ
Interaction terms between some of the alternative-variant and alternative-invariant
variables depend on i and j and are considered in x0ij. Taking the derivative of the
probability with respect to the alternative-variant variables yields the marginal eﬀect
of an increase in a regressor on the probability of selecting alternative j, that is:
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@pij
@xik
¼ pij Indðj ¼ kÞ  pik½ b; ð3Þ
where Ind () is an indicator function, equalling one if j = k, and zero otherwise.
The alternative-variant variable coeﬃcients resulting from the CLM are used to
estimate the coexistence costs, that is, the marginal rate of substitution of the coexis-
tence measure attribute and the monetary gross margin attribute, which is given by:
W ¼  bcoexistence measure
bgross margin
 !
: ð4Þ
In this study, the interpretation of the non-monetary and monetary attribute
parameter ratio is the willingness-to-accept rather than willingness-to-pay as farmers
only accept coexistence measures if they get additional gross margin. Independently
of this interpretation, however, W represents the cost of an attribute and hence the
cost of coexistence measures.
2.5. Principal component analysis
Farmers were asked to rank several items on a Likert scale, to measure their attitudes
towards GMOs. To include the attitudes in the choice experiment, we use a Principal
Component Analysis (PCA).6 The PCA explores if the variance of responses to an
item overlaps with the variance of other items to form some common construct (com-
ponent) (Costello and Osborne, 2005).
Even though explanatory factor analysis is more reliable in explaining an underly-
ing construct, we use PCA as it is more robust because it assumes that all variance –
the variance shared with other items and a part that is unique to the item – can be
analysed compared to factor analysis, which explains the shared variance only (Cost-
ello and Osborne, 2005).7
The Kaiser-Meyer-Okin (KMO) (Kaiser, 1970) measure of sampling adequacy is
used to test whether the sample is large enough and the Cronbach’s alpha analysis to
test the reliability of the component (see Appendix S2 in the online supplementary
material, available at the publisher’s website). Finally, the farmers’ perception is mea-
sured by their score on each construct. This score is the weighted average of all item
values that comprise a component.
3. Results
3.1. Statistics of sample farms
Our sample farms cover 0.03% of UAA in Germany and produce 9,174 hectares of
maize (see online Appendix S1).8 Our sample covers 30% of the Bt maize farms that
planted 37% of the 2008 Bt maize area. Our sample contains farms that planted a
somewhat larger area than the average Bt maize producer. The size of Bt maize par-
cels, however, is similar to the average of the 2008 registered parcels, as the share of
6A more detailed explanation of the procedure is outlined in online Appendix S2.
7We use Varimax rotation – an ‘orthogonal rotation’ that forces the factors to be uncorrelated
with each other.
8Note that we asked farmers about their farm size in the year before the survey, that is, in 2012.
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the number of parcels to the total number of parcels (63/200 = 31.5%) almost equals
the share of Bt maize farmers to the total number of Bt maize farmers (30%). Of the
1,182 hectares, 77% was silage maize and 23% was grain maize.
Table 4 reports the mean socio-demographic and farm descriptive variables of all
sample farms. For comparison, the fourth column represents data from Germany.
The farms can be considered average maize producers at least in relative terms where
maize occupies about 19.8% of their area, compared to 16% on average for
Germany.
The SD and the ranges for all variables imply that the data are very heterogeneous.
However, parametric as well as non-parametric statistical tests for diﬀerences indicate
that the heterogeneity is independent from diﬀerences between sample Bt and non-Bt
farms’ and farmers’ characteristics. The sample mean and mean for German data
imply that the sample includes relatively large farms.
The average maize area per farm in the sample is 222 hectares. None of the 2008
maize variables (e.g. total maize area, average maize ﬁeld size) diﬀered signiﬁcantly
between Bt and non-Bt farmers. Although grain maize yield did not diﬀer between Bt
and non-Bt farmers, 11 farmers reported it was higher by 0.8 tonnes/ha for Bt maize
(yield of 9.7 tonnes/ha) compared to the yield of their own conventional maize. The
reported yield of Bt and conventional silage maize did not diﬀer within farms. Four
Bt maize farms planted Bt maize in 2008 for the ﬁrst time. Except for one farm, all
other Bt maize farms increased their Bt maize area from their ﬁrst year of production
until 2008 with reasons including: higher quality (n = 18); reduced pest damage
(n = 14); a higher proﬁt (n = 11). Crop rotation was also a reason why the area allo-
cated to Bt maize changed between years (either increased or decreased) (n = 5).
Table 4
Socio-demographic and farm characteristics of the farm sample and Germany
Unit
Sample
Germany*
Mean SD Min–Max Mean
Age Years 51.0 11.2 23–75 >45.0
Farm employees N 21.6 21.0 1.5–96
Neighbours N 14.0 18.1 2–100
UAA per farm Hectares 1,147.3 897.4 4–3,300 63.0†
UAA per farm (juristic)‡ Hectares 1,418.4 818.8 35–360 630.7
UAA per farm (single)§ Hectares 144.2 116.4 4–3,300 43.9
Share of rented area % 65 11.2 0–95 60.0
Maize ﬁeld size 2008 Hectares 17.0 11.7 0.04–55.7
Total maize area 2008 Hectares 222.2 202.5 6–800
Bt maize area 2008 Hectares 43.8 47.2 0.04–200 34.8
Bt grain maize area 2008 Hectares 20.5 15.6 2–50
Bt silage maize area 2008 Hectares 50.8 52.7 0.04–200
Observations N 47 299,100¶
Note: *as of 2010, †only ‘main livelihood’ farms, ‡n(Bt) = 24, n(non-Bt) = 13, §n(Bt) = 3, n(non-
Bt) = 7; ¶Total number of farms.
Source: Own calculations based on sample data; DEStatis (2012) data for Germany.
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Out of the 17 farmers who stated that their revenue increased, only 13 were able to
assess the increase. Their mean was €115/ha.
Most non-Bt maize farmers expected no price diﬀerence between Bt and non-Bt
maize, probably (as indicated by some interviewees) due to the use of maize as feed.
However, on average they expected a yield increase of 9.3% (about 0.9 tonnes) and
additional gross margin of €34.4 (median value of €5) per hectare. The expected yield
increase does not diﬀer much from the one tonne yield increase found in the meta-
analysis by Areal et al. (2013).
3.2. Farmers’ attitudes towards Bt maize cultivation
A Likert scale consisting of 15 items was included in the questionnaire to survey farm-
ers’ attitudes towards GM crops and their perception of related beneﬁts and risks of
GM technologies and the role of the government.
Figure 1 shows the mean results of Bt and non-Bt farmers. We tested whether the
distribution of given answers diﬀers signiﬁcantly using Fisher’s exact test. Eight of 15
item response distributions diﬀered signiﬁcantly between Bt and non-Bt farmers. Bt
and non-Bt sample farmers agreed on average that GM crops should be approved, if
the majority of consumers is in favour of them (question 1). They also agree that GM
crops should be approved if farmers ﬁnd them useful (question 2). This result conﬁrms
results by Skevas et al. (2012) who asked similar questions in their survey of Greek
farmers. Our results, however, diﬀer from Skevas et al. (2012) for question 11, 12, and
13 on the potential environmental and health risks and the unnaturalness of GM
crops, where our farmers disagree on average. On the other hand, farmers tended to
agree that food safety risks are among the most important ones (question 8); that GM
crops can eradicate diseases and pests (question 10); and that the rejection of GM
crops makes EU farmers less competitive. Farmers were rather neutral about trust in
food labels (question 3), harmfulness of food additives, and the ability of the govern-
ment to manage potential health and environmental damages (questions 4 and 5). Bt
farmers disagreed more strongly than non-Bt farmers that human interference in
nature would have disastrous consequences.
3.3. Estimation of coexistence costs
Costs of coexistence measures were estimated from the choice experiment data. Each
farmer’s principal component score (PCS) on a single construct derived from the PCA
(Table S1 in the online Appendix S1) was used as an alternative-invariant variable in
the CLM. The higher the score of farmers on the component, the more they agree
with items opposing GM crops.
We estimated two variations of the CLM of 47 farmers who ﬁlled out 12 choice sets
each (Table 5). The ﬁrst estimation is unrestricted while the second estimation is the
parsimonious model excluding all insigniﬁcant variables that do not improve the mod-
el’s goodness of ﬁt when compared with a likelihood ratio test.
The reference level for the coeﬃcient estimates of the alternative-invariant variables
is conventional production. Therefore, a positive value implies that a larger value of
the respective variable relates to a higher likelihood of choosing Bt maize. The refer-
ence level for the alternative variant variables (i.e. the coexistence measures) is the
zero level of each attribute (i.e. not liable, no isolation distance, no information provi-
sion, and no temporal isolation distance). On average, 56.2% farmers chose the
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conventional alternative (i.e. the reference category), 22.3% the ﬁrst Bt alternative
(Bt1), and 21.5% the second Bt alternative (Bt2).
Only two alternative-invariant coeﬃcient estimates were signiﬁcant: the PCS and
the number of neighbours. Unlike previous studies, which found a positive impact of
farm size measured by UAA on the adoption (Hubbell et al., 2000; Qaim and de Jan-
vry, 2003; Breustedt et al., 2008), we found no eﬀect. It is, however, important to
stress that the sample Bt maize farms in our sample were much larger than the average
German farm. This size eﬀect is probably due to self-selection of larger farms cultivat-
ing Bt maize. If this is the case, farm size positively aﬀects the adoption, and we can-
not identify a size-eﬀect due to a self-selection bias. Two further insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients were found for farmer’s age and education. Previous studies show either a
positive or a negative impact of education on the adoption of GM crops (Breustedt
1. If the majority of European consumers are in 
favour of GM crops they should be approved
2. If farmers think that a GM crop is useful to them 
they should be allowed to grow it
3. Food labels can be trusted
4. I think additives in food are not harmful to my 
health
5. The health risks surrounding GM crops can be 
managed by the government
6. The environmental risks surrounding GM crops 
can be managed by the government
7. When humans interfere with nature  disastrous 
consequences result
8. Among the risks we face in our lives, those 
impacting food safety are very important
9. Pesticides and fertilizers are dangerous to the 
environment
10. We can eradicate the diseases and pests that 
attack crops by using GM crops
11. GM crops are against nature
12. Harmful environmental effects of GM foods 
are likely to appear in the future
13. Harmful human health effects of GM foods are 
likely to appear in the future
14. GM crops are the future of agriculture
15. Rejecting GM crops will make EU farmers 
uncompetitive on the world market
1 2 3 4 5
non-Bt Bt
Increasing agreement
Figure 1. Mean values of Likert scale values for Bt and non-Bt farmers (n = 47). The scale
rages from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
Note: Items for which Fisher’s exact test for diﬀerences between the distribution of Bt and non-
Bt farmers is statistically signiﬁcant are: 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
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et al., 2008). We also did not ﬁnd an eﬀect of the dummy for arable farming, which is
one if the farm is a pure arable farm, and zero if the farm also has livestock. We
expected a negative eﬀect assuming that Bt maize can be used as feed without aﬀecting
the outcome of animal production, whereas marketing Bt maize could be more prob-
lematic. However, agreements of grain traders to buy Bt and conventional maize at
equal prices may weaken or refute the marketing problem argument.
All statistically signiﬁcant non-monetary attribute coeﬃcients (i.e. coexistence mea-
sure) are negative, meaning that when the respective attribute is present, the Bt alter-
native containing this attribute is less likely to be chosen. For example, the 4-week
temporal isolation coeﬃcient of 3.43 in the parsimonious model indicates that if
farmers had to implement this measure, they would be less likely to adopt Bt maize.
Furthermore, farmers value the lower level of each attribute as less demanding. For
example, the absolute value of the 2-week temporal isolation distance of 0.98 is
lower than the value for 4-week isolation. The sign of the coeﬃcient of the monetary
Table 5
Determinants of Bt maize adoption of Bt and non-Bt farmers
Variable/attribute Attribute level Unrestricted model Parsimonious model
Constant 1.87** (0.86) 1.64*** (0.44)
PCS 0.74*** (0.15) 0.71*** (0.14)
Number of neighbours 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
Education 0.03 (0.09)
Farmer’s age 0.01 (0.01)
Farm size 0.00 (0.00)
Arable farm 0.28 (0.45)
Liability Negligence 1.06*** (0.31) 0.63*** (0.19)
Joint and strict 1.86*** (0.39) 1.98*** (0.25)
Isolation distance 50 m 1.26 (0.34) 0.80** (0.31)
100 m 2.22*** (0.61) 1.82*** (0.42)
Information provision Neighbour 0.02 (0.35)
Public register 0.39 (0.44)
Temporal isolation 2 weeks 1.10*** (0.36) 0.98*** (0.23)
4 weeks 3.93*** (0.56) 3.43*** (0.33)
Negligence 9 Bt 0.53 (0.34)
Joint and strict 9 Bt 0.29 (0.46)
50 m 9 Bt 1.36** (0.52) 0.76** (0.32)
100 m 9 Bt 1.44* (0.80) 0.75** (0.35)
Neighbour 9 Bt 0.30 (0.37)
Public register 9 Bt 0.65 (0.52)
2 weeks 9 Bt 0.26 (0.40)
4 weeks 9 Bt 0.60 (0.63)
Gross margin 9 Bt 0.004 (0.005)
Gross margin 0.012*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.002)
Log-likelihood 420 428
Akaike information criterion 905 885
Note: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1 signiﬁcance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent vari-
able = ‘Probability of choosing Bt maize instead of conventional maize’. 9, interaction; PCS,
Principal Component Score on farmer’s attitudes towards GMOs.
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attribute, that is, the extra gross margin from growing Bt maize is, as expected, posi-
tive.9 The only insigniﬁcant coexistence measure is information provision for both
attribute levels: the neighbours and the public register. The model also includes the
alternative-invariant Bt variable as an interaction term to the alternative-variant
coexistence measures. This variable equals one when the individual is a Bt farmer, and
zero otherwise, and is used to check whether cost estimates diﬀer between Bt and
non-Bt farmers. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences are only observed for isolation distances.
The PCS estimate is positive, indicating that farmers with a high PCS (i.e. with pos-
itive responses towards GMOs) are more likely to choose one of the Bt options. The
more positive perception relationship with higher adoption likelihood is consistent
with a survey on Bt maize adoption in Spain (Gomez-Barbero et al., 2008).
Table 6 presents the marginal eﬀects in the third column and the coexistence costs
in the fourth column. Both estimates are derived from the parsimonious model. The
marginal eﬀects refer in percentage points to the eﬀect of an increase in the respective
variable by one unit on the probability of choosing Bt maize instead of conventional
maize. The interpretation of the marginal eﬀects of the coexistence measures – those
are included as dummy variables in the choice set – is that if the respective coexistence
measure is present, the probability of choosing Bt maize changes by the marginal
eﬀect’s percentage points. The coexistence costs are computed by dividing coexistence
measure coeﬃcients (e.g. 3.43 in the case of 4-week isolation) by the gross margin
coeﬃcient (e.g. 0.010). The ordering of magnitudes of coexistence costs follows the
ordering of magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients.
If a farmer has one additional neighbour, the farmer’s probability of choosing Bt
maize decreases by 0.2 percentage points. This may have several reasons. The more
neighbours a farmer has, the more coordination is necessary. Even though the esti-
mated costs are zero for informing the neighbours about Bt maize cultivation,
Table 6
Marginal eﬀects and coexistence costs of coexistence attributes
Attribute Attribute level
Marginal eﬀect
(percentage points)
Coexistence
costs (€/ha)
Liability Negligence 9.5 60.6
Joint and strict 29.8 189.1
Isolation distance 50 m (non-Bt) 5.4 76.1
50 m (Bt) 0.2 4.0
100 m (non-Bt) 20.9 174.1
100 m (Bt) 16.2 100.4
Information provision Neighbour 0.0
Public register 0.0
Temporal isolation 2 weeks 14.8 93.9
4 weeks 51.6 328.0
Principal Component Score 8.6
Number of neighbours 0.2
9Note that we tested also for non-linearity of the gross margin as was suggested by an anony-
mous referee. The coeﬃcient for the squared gross margin was insigniﬁcant.
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Breustedt et al. (2008) show a GM-hostile neighbour can negatively aﬀect the adop-
tion probability, while a GM-friendly neighbour can positively aﬀect adoption.
Our results show that the highest coexistence costs of about €328 for farmers are
related to the temporal isolation distance of 4 weeks. This result is consistent with
estimates of about €201 for France showing that temporal isolation can be one of the
most expensive measures (Messean et al., 2006). The high cost reﬂects the need to
switch between very late and late varieties.10 Our results also support the arguments
of Messeguer et al. (2006), Weber et al. (2007) and Devos et al. (2009) that temporal
scheduling to isolate Bt maize ﬂowering from non-Bt maize ﬂowering is not an eﬀec-
tive measure if the seeding window is very short as in non-Mediterranean regions like
Germany. This may explain the exclusion of temporal isolation distance from the
obligatory coexistence measures in Germany, as is the case at present.
Of the obligatory measures, joint and strict liability has the highest cost of €189/ha.
If liability is restricted to negligence, the cost is lower at €61/ha. Isolation distance of
100 m is the third costliest measure at €174 for non-Bt farmers, and €100 for Bt farm-
ers. Similarly, Bt farmers valued the 50-m isolation distance lower than their non-Bt
neighbours. Since we control for attitudes towards Bt (with the PCS variable), and
since the Bt vs. non-Bt diﬀerences exhibit solely on the costs of isolation, this implies
that the actual costs of isolation are lower than those expected ex ante. Alternatively,
Bt farmers have other unobserved diﬀerences which account for these lower costs.
4. Discussion
Coexistence measures such as joint and strict liability rules and the public register
were put in place in Germany for Bt maize between 2005 and 2008. Isolation distance
and information provision to neighbours were introduced in 2008. Our high cost esti-
mates of joint and strict liability (€189/ha) appear to contradict the idea of proﬁt-max-
imising farmers since the average additional revenue for Bt farmers was estimated at
only €115/ha and the additional gross margin found by Areal et al. (2013) was €65.
However, farmers may have planted Bt maize in the presence of joint and strict liabil-
ity because, as some farmers mentioned, one of the grain traders paid the same price
for conventional and Bt maize while the GM seed supplying company safeguarded
potential economic damage given farmer compliance with the laws. In the absence of
such private insurance by grain traders and seed suppliers, compensation funds are a
potential way to reduce liability costs. These funds cover accidental cross pollination
as long as the farmer follows ex-ante regulations. Since the fund would only be paid if
farmers complied with the ex-ante measures, it would reduce the coexistence costs
from €189 to €61 in our estimates. The funds can be ﬁnanced through a small tariﬀ,
for example, on the price of the GM seed bag by private stakeholders, as is the case
for measures in the Netherlands, Portugal and Ireland or paid by the GM farmer and
the government as in Denmark (Beckmann et al., 2006).
An alternative solution to compensation funds is the grouping of Bt maize farmers
in clubs as implemented for Bt maize in Portugal (Skevas et al., 2009) but also
reported for identity preservation of organic mustard in Canada (Furtan et al., 2007).
Punt and Wesseler (2015) show that famers form clubs depending on the property
10These costs are smaller if farmers have to switch from a late to a mid-early variety and larger,
if they must switch from a very late to a mid-early variety (Messean et al., 2006).
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rights as well as the liability regime. The perceived high costs related to liability in our
study supports the results of Punt and Wesseler (2015) that clubs will be large and
stable but may not always completely solve the problem.
The presence of minimum distance requirements might have been one of the rea-
sons why Bt farmers decided to plant Bt maize while their neighbours did not, as Bt
farmers valued minimum distance as less costly. However, we cannot exclude poten-
tial reverse causation: farmers valued the distance requirement attribute less because
they already had a positive experience from Bt maize cultivation and found it unprob-
lematic to keep the minimum distance. Nevertheless, minimum distance costs for
100-m distance may restrict Bt maize adoption as those costs are greater than the
average gross margin. The 50-m isolation distance, however, was estimated to be
much lower. This lower distance would be suﬃcient to maintain cross-fertilisation
levels below 0.5% at the border of the recipient maize ﬁeld (Sanvido et al., 2008). A
further reduction in coexistence costs to more eﬃciently reduce the extent of cross-
fertilisation might be achieved through a negotiability or replacement of isolation
distance by pollen barriers (Demont et al., 2009). A 10- to 20-m pollen barrier may be
comparable to a 50-m isolation distance of bare ground (Devos et al., 2005).
Our estimates for information provision to the neighbour and the public register
were insigniﬁcant, implying zero ex-ante coexistence costs of information provision.
An explanation for the insigniﬁcant result might be that the information provision
process per se is inexpensive. However, information provision may have some poten-
tial negative externalities ignored by farmers. Negative externalities can be ﬁeld
destruction by anti-GMO activists, since the information enables or facilitates ﬁnding
out the exact place of the Bt maize ﬁelds. For example, environmental non-govern-
mental organisations ‘. . . linked the location register with [their] own geographical
maps and internet information on how to reach GM ﬁelds’ (Vaasen et al., 2006). Field
destruction was of concern to Bt maize farmers in our sample as well as in previous
case studies. However, this externality may be of less concern to farmers when the
GM seed provider agrees to compensate farmers for damage due to vandalism as is,
for example, the case in Portugal (Skevas et al., 2009). Furthermore, the primary aim
of the register is to monitor adverse environmental eﬀects. This monitoring would be
possible without public access. The register is only publically available to increase
transparency.
That informing neighbours has been assessed by farmers as inexpensive is further
supported by the low negative aﬀect of an additional neighbour on the decision to
adopt Bt maize. This is an important result. Even so, GM crops are controversial, per-
haps also among farmers, though they do not appear to increase conﬂicts between
farmers in our sample.
5. Conclusion
Former Bt farmers and their non-Bt neighbours in Germany present a unique case for
evaluating the practicality and cost of coexistence measures. Our sample contains
about 30% of the former Bt maize farmers and some of their neighbours. Descriptive
statistics of Bt farm characteristics reveal that mainly above average size farms chose
to plant Bt maize.
Farm size as well as other farm characteristics of the sample Bt farmers were not
found to diﬀer statistically signiﬁcantly from their non-Bt neighbours, but their atti-
tudes towards GM crop cultivation do. On the one hand, the above average farm size
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character due to a self-selection bias allows us to draw only limited conclusions for a
larger population with diﬀerent characteristics. On the other hand, the similarity
between Bt farms and non-Bt neighbour farms in our sample indicate that farmers’
attitudes plays a major role in the Bt maize adoption decision in common with other
studies.
We ﬁnd that farmers value temporal isolation as the costliest coexistence measure,
conﬁrming its unsuitability in non-Mediterranean countries and explaining its exclu-
sion from the set of coexistence measures in Germany. Strict liability is the costliest
obligatory coexistence measure in Germany followed by large minimum distance
requirements. Compensation funds may help reduce liability costs. The eﬀect of infor-
mation provision to neighbours or the public register on the adoption probability was
insigniﬁcant. Further, an increase in the number of neighbours had only a negligible
negative eﬀect on the adoption decision. Hence, we conclude, agreements between
neighbours can be a suitable and cost-eﬃcient strategy to reduce the costs of mini-
mum distance requirements. In this sense, voluntary solutions by farmers seem to be
very suitable for achieving coexistence. This should come as no surprise since coopera-
tion between neighbouring farmers for many diﬀerent reasons is more common than
conﬂict.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1. Utilised agricultural area (UUA), Bt silage and Bt maize grain area.
Appendix S2. Principal Component Analysis results.
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